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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the question of whether the national production functions of patents owned by 
universities and public research organisations (PROs) differ. We use Eurostat patent and R&D data broken down 
by institutional sector for the European Union 27 and other countries in years 1982-2007, and we estimate 
dynamic panel models. The impact of R&D expenditure on patent ownership is higher for PROs than for 
universities. University patent ownership activity is dependent on business funding, while PRO patent ownership 
is not. We recommend a reversal of the current decline of PRO R&D expenditure and discuss whether PROs 
perform better at macroeconomic level vis a vis universities. 
Keywords: academic patenting; technology transfer; scientific production 
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1. Introduction 
University patents form part of the markets for science and technology. They are a measure 
of research production that describes the conduct of universities and a technology transfer 
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mechanism responsive to changes in public policy (Goel and Rich 2005). The trend for 
universities to apply for and own patents has been increasing in the EU for some decades. 
There are several reasons for the rise in the number of university-owned patents: changes in 
knowledge production increasing the capacity of university researchers to produce patentable 
inventions and scientific publications (Meyer 2006; Baldini 2006b; Azagra et al. 2007a; 
Breschi et al. 2008; Baldini 2009)
1
, policy support based on the belief that the EU is less 
productive than the US (Dosi et al. 2006), access to industry knowledge, practical experience 
and the possibilities for its application (Arvanitis et al. 2008), and changes in societal demand 
and funding conditions. These reasons have been the motivation for regulatory changes in 
some countries to allow universities to own patents (Baldini 2006a; Baldini et al. 2006) and in 
universities to share royalties with academic inventors and departments (Baldini 2010) or to 
accommodate IPR sharing with partners (Okamuro and Nishimura 2013). Patents are one of 
the few benefits in common of establishing partnerships for university and industry (Ankra et 
al. 2013), although academics mainly use patents for commercialisation and prefer other 
channels of interaction for research purposes (Gaughan and Corley 2010; D’Este and 
Perkmann 2011). 
It is unfortunate that PROs have not attracted as much research attention as universities. 
Government laboratories are an important part of many national innovation systems (Nelson 
and Rosenberg, 1993). In most countries, the top patenting public institutions are the large 
PROs, for example, the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France, the 
National Research Council (CNR) in Italy and the Spanish National Research Council (CSIC) 
in Spain (Cesaroni and Piccaluga 2005), rather than universities. PROs, like universities, need 
to justify their public funding, and analysis of universities on their own provides incomplete 
information for systems where university and PRO activity is intertwined (Bach and Llerena 
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2007). PROs are also under pressure to increase their visibility through patent ownership, but 
may approach this problem in different ways. 
The objective of this paper is to compare the production of patents owned by universities 
and PROs using country-years as the unit of observation. The two main research questions 
are: Is the impact of R&D expenditure on patent ownership higher for PROs than for 
universities? Is the impact of the share of business funding of R&D on patent ownership 
higher for universities than for PROs? 
Section 2 provides a review of the literature and Section 3 discusses the data and 
methodology used in this paper, Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses 
2.1. Differences between the determinants of university and PRO patent ownership 
In many of the microeconomic production functions estimated using universities as the unit 
of observation (Coupé 2003; Azagra et al. 2003; 2006a, b; 2007a; Baldini et al. 2006; Carayol 
2007; Acosta et al. 2008; Wong and Singh 2009; Baldini 2009), one of the theoretical 
determinants of university-owned patents is university R&D expenditures and/or other 
measures for university research size, such as R&D staff. The impact of R&D on patents 
tends to be positive and significant, with elasticities lower than 1. 
For instance, Coupé (2003), focusing on the elasticity of university R&D in US, finds 
evidence of decreasing returns to scale. Microeconomic studies on the European context, 
using departments, institutes and labs within universities, point to decreasing returns to R&D 
expenditure in the production of university patents (Azagra et al. 2003; Azagra et al. 2006a). 
At the level of universities, Baldini et al. (2006) show some evidence of no impact on their 
proxy for size (budget transfer from central government). 
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Mesoeconomic analyses for the Spanish regions suggest that returns to R&D expenditure 
are increasing for universities, based perhaps on spillover effects due to the higher level of 
aggregation (Azagra et al. 2006b; 2007a). However, the Spanish case may be peculiar due to 
the small average size of the country's universities. For the EU-15, still at regional level, 
returns to R&D expenditure appear to be constant in the period 1998 to 2002 (Acosta et al. 
2008). To what extent these results apply at country level, for the EU-27, and over a longer 
time span is unknown; given the slightly more abundant microeconomic evidence, we expect 
low returns to R&D expenditure when using countries as the unit of observation. Indirect 
support to this assumption is the finding that regional university R&D expenditure does not 
affect the number of forward references to European university-owned patents (Acosta et al. 
2012). 
Several scholars have described patent ownership by PROs (e.g. Cesaroni and Piccaluga 
2005; Potì and Reale 2005; Bach and Llerena 2007; Moutinho et al. 2007). Some include 
patenting as a predictor of other phenomena, like publication output (Buenstorf 2009), 
academic entrepreneurship (Krabel and Mueller 2009) and technology transfer (Grimpe and 
Fier 2010). However, to our knowledge, the only application of the patent production function 
in the context of PRO-owned patents is the work by Azagra et al. (2007b), which provides 
microeconomic evidence for the case of CSIC, the largest Spanish PRO. They find a large 
elasticity of the size variable used – research staff, closely related to R&D expenditure, but 
also – and in contrast to universities – the presence of increasing returns to R&D. They 
suggest that university departments, laboratories and whole universities grow in terms of 
teaching function, while PROs grow based on R&D demand to reach critical mass. 
The above reasoning justifies the expected impact of R&D on patents to be low for 
universities and high for PROs, so we hypothesise that: 
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Hypothesis 1. The impact of R&D expenditure on patent ownership is higher for PROs than 
for universities. 
Funding from industry, based on increased contracting out of R&D to universities and 
PROs, is an important component of university R&D funding (Geuna et al. 2004). However, 
the impact of this funding is difficult to predict. Traditionally, firms are more likely to use 
IPR methods, and this may be influencing universities to do the same (Azagra et al. 2003). 
However, firms are more likely to own the results of the research they fund, which may 
explain why university-owned patents are more responsive to public funding and university-
invented patents more responsive to private funding (Azagra et al. 2006a). If both types of 
patents are considered, the positive effect of private funding predominates, at the laboratory 
(Azagra et al. 2006a) and the individual level (Carayol 2007). 
The impact of business funding on patent ownership among PROs has received little 
attention. While many PROs have a long-standing tradition of patenting, the involvement of 
European universities in patenting is mostly relatively recent. Traditionally, universities 
mostly engage in project-based research. Among PROs, some perform more project-based 
research (e.g. CNRS, CSIC, Max Planck Society), and others are contract research institutions 
(Fraunhofer Society, VTT). Hence, PROs are more acquainted with patenting and patent 
ownership regardless of the level of funding from private sources. Azagra et al.’s (2007b) 
measure of business funding related to CSIC research is not significant. We can hypothesise 
that: 
Hypothesis 2. The impact of the share of business funding of R&D expenditure on patent 
ownership is higher for universities than for PROs. 
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2.2. Other determinants of university and PRO patent ownership at macroeconomic level 
The firm’s patent/R&D ratio is a priori a good indicator that captures national peculiarities 
related to IPRs or, as Meyer et al. (2005) argue, the determinants of the wider (national, 
cultural) drivers of academic inventive activity. It includes the differences in legal systems 
and cultures related to patent application and helps to explain whether patent ownership by 
universities is related to local framework conditions. 
We also need to introduce R&D expenditures by PROs when explaining patent production 
of universities and vice versa. The two realms of public research (PROs and universities) 
interact together. Universities are very likely to benefit from PRO’s R&D expenditure, and 
the other way round. A model of patent ownership has to accept this possibility, especially in 
the light of national differences. 
Finally, it seems convenient to control for national level involvement in university and 
PRO-invented patents. Lissoni et al. (2008) pose the question of why do European 
universities not retain the IPRs over their scientists’ inventions? The implication is that 
university-owned and university-invented patents represent different alternatives for 
technology transfer: licensing and signalling (implicit in university-owned patents) or 
research for/with industry (university-invented patents). National legal and institutional 
frameworks play a major role. Some include more incentives for individual researchers to 
gain academic prestige or personal income, independent of the regulatory framework allowing 
university staff to own patents. If these alternatives are complements, that is, if academics are 
active inventors in patents owned by their universities (PROs) and patents owned by other 
institutions, then university (PRO) patent ownership will not reduce technology transfer. This 
applies to universities and PROs, since both engage into collaborative agreements with 
companies that may result into the company filing a patent with equal probability (Núñez-
Sánchez et al. 2012). 
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2.3. Dynamic effects/National institutional histories 
Regarding the regulatory conditions specific to IPRs at universities and PROs, recall the 
academic debate starting in the US following the Bayh-Dole Act, which allows universities to 
apply for patents based on their R&D. Other countries with different institutional frameworks 
show higher or lower numbers of university or PRO patents. In the EU the following general 
statements apply (again, the case of universities is better documented than that of PROs). 
 The ownership regime of PROs varies over time. Some countries privatised (notably the 
UK) some of their PROs in the late 1990s (PREST 2002), which may be promoting higher 
patent ownership in these institutions. 
 The strength of knowledge transfer offices varies across countries, with a longer tradition in 
the UK and Spain (Proton 2007), which may be increasing the number of university and 
PRO-owned patents. 
 In France, there is a strong link between PROs and universities, so co-patenting is frequent. 
The IPRs belong to the applying institution, and the 1999 Innovation Law increased the 
incentives for universities to apply for patents. 
 Some high-income countries have low levels of university or PRO patent ownership 
because the legislative framework does not allow it. This may be the explanation for low 
levels in Denmark, Germany and Austria, which moved from systems based on professor’s 
privilege (professors had the first right to apply for the patent, followed by the university) to 
a more US-like system (the university has the priority) only in 2000, 2001 and 2002, 
respectively (Baldini 2006). In other Scandinavian countries, such as Finland (Meyer et al. 
2005) or Sweden (Lissoni et al. 2008; Nilsson et al. 2010), inventors still have ownership 
rights. 
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 In the exceptional case of Italy, inventor privilege was superior to university privilege only 
between 2001 and 2004 (Potì and Reale 2005; Baldini et al. 2006). The changed pattern may 
be the explanation for the growing number of university-owned patents. 
 In countries where regulation is unclear, the number of patents generally is lower. In 
Portugal, for example, institutions retain the ownership, but there are no specific regulations 
regarding royalty shares, duty of disclosure or the period allowed for the decision to patent. 
In Greece patent ownership is subject to negotiation (Cesaroni and Piccaluga 2005). 
 Analyses of university patents in the new EU member states are few. Most of these 
countries are former communist economies and although IPR technical requirements were 
similar, the individual incentives to patent were much smaller (Marinova 2001). These 
states have been classified as a block of ‘countries where IPR ownership was assigned to the 
State and which switched to institutional ownership after the early 1990s’ (Geuna and Rossi 
2011). 
It is beyond the scope of our model to find specific variables that capture the nature of each 
one of these phenomena. However, in order to take them into account, we will propose 
dynamic models where the patenting history of academic institutions forms part of the 
explanation of current patent ownership. This way, any measured influences of our target 
variables (R&D expenditure and share of business funding) will be conditioned on this 
history, i.e. any impact of R&D expenditure and share of business funding will represent the 
effect of new information. 
3. Data 
We use panel data on number of university and PRO-owned patents, and university and 
PRO R&D expenditure in millions of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) deflated at 1995 
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prices, from Eurostat’s online database, which is regularly updated. The unit of observation is 
one country in one year. 
Data on patents refer to applications to the European Patent Office (EPO). Years of the 
patents are those of the priority date, which are more meaningful than application or grant 
date, from a technological or economic point of view, because it is the closest to the date of 
invention (OECD 2001). Although data go back to 1977, the period of observation starts in 
1982 to match available information for the R&D variable. The year 2007 is the last available 
with information on patents. Our sample period is 26 years. The initial sample countries are 
the 27 EU member states (although we will widen the sample in a later robustness check). 
The distinction between institutional sectors (universities and PROs) is based on Eurostat’s 
project on Data Production Methods for Harmonised Patent Statistics (Van Looy et al. 2006). 
Geuna and Rossi (2011) use similar data to describe changes in university patenting in 
Europe. In the estimations, we will refer to two samples, the university and the PRO samples, 
but the unit of observation will be the same –the country-year. 
A limitation of using EPO patents is the possible home advantage effect which may 
underestimate the number of US patents. However, the effect has been studied only for 
multinational firms and not academic institutions. In the context of firms, patents have several 
limitations such as representing a mix of discoveries with widely differing economic value. 
However, Patel and Pavitt (1995) argue that we can expect similar and large variations in the 
value of R&D across all countries. In the specific case of universities or PROs and EPO 
patents, there are other advantages. First, for these institutions patents are a proxy not of 
innovation but of ownership of scientific results. Second, there are fewer differences because 
patents tend to be concentrated in science-based sectors (Pavitt 1998) and universities or 
PROs only take out patents through the EPO for their (potentially) most valuable inventions 
(Azagra et al. 2006b). 
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Regarding R&D expenditure, our data refer to the extensively used measure compiled by 
Eurostat from national surveys, following the OECD Frascati Manual. In relation to number 
of patents, there is a lag of one period in order to reduce endogeneity.
2
 
A limitation of matching patent and R&D databases is the sectoral distribution of hospitals. 
While patent statistics classify all hospitals into a single category, R&D statistics classify 
them the categories of business enterprise, government, higher education and private non-
profit. Therefore, relating PRO patents to PRO R&D expenditure means we cannot include 
patents applied for by public, non-university hospitals, but we will be counting their R&D 
expenditure. The same applies to university patents and R&D from university hospitals. To 
compare universities and PROs, this is not a problem if the same share of hospital patents is 
subtracted from university and PRO patents. If the number of hospital patents is randomly 
assigned across countries, this will cancel out unobservable differences. In any case, the 
number of hospital patents is around 6 per cent of academic patents, so the difference is not 
likely to be dramatic. 
The panel starts with 728 observations, but after matching patent and R&D data, 347 are 
non-missing for the university sample and 357 for the PRO sample. The number of 
observations further decreases to 247 for universities and 258 for PROs because of the need to 
use one or two periods less, according to the econometric approach that follows. 
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 This is not to imply that it takes 1 year between R&D spending and applying for a patent, since the 
possibilities are enormous. The assumption is that 1-year-lagged R&D expenditure is a good enough predictor of 
what will happen to patents in the next period, because 1-year-old R&D expenditure already incorporates 
information from older R&D expenditure. In addition, most studies dealing with the R&D-patent relationship 
use a 1-year lagged value of R&D expenditure, probably because of its quite contemporaneous relation with 
patents (Hall et al. 1986). 
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4. Econometric approach 
4.1. Model and variables 
We consider academic (university or PRO) patent ownership a dynamic process. Hence, in 
addition to those variables suggested in the literature review, we include the lagged dependent 
variable in the right hand side of the model to be estimated: 
 
i,t i,t j
1
1 i,t 1 2 i,t 1
3
Ln #  of academic owned patents  Ln #  of academic owned patents
Ln R & D expenditure Share of business funding of academic R & D expenditure
Share of university R & D expendit
m
j
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

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 
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1
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j

 
 


 
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 (1) 
“Academic” may mean either universities or PROs, depending on the sample. The subscript 
i stands for country, t for year.  
In order to eliminate the individual effect, the model is converted into first differences. The 
resulting equation has dependent variable: 
 
i,t i,t
i,t 1
Ln #  of academic owned patents Ln #  of academic owned patents
Ln #  of academic owned patents 
    
 
 (2) 
We use lags of the dependent variable as instruments and obtain Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimators. Specifically, we use the Arellano-Bond method (Arellano and 
Bond 1991).
3
 The number of lags, j, is initially one, but if specification tests suggest the 
presence of autocorrelation, we add more lags until we correct it (two lags maximum have 
been needed). The number of instruments is not limited unless the Sargan tests suggests the 
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 We have also run standard panel regression techniques, with time dummies instead of a trend, and models 
with autocorrelation, all with similar results. 
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presence of overidentifying restrictions, and in this case, we reduce the number of 
instruments. 
Table 1 lists the definitions and Table 2 the descriptive statistics for the patent and R&D 
variables and the other determinants of university and PRO patents. 
{Table 1 around here} 
{Table 2 around here} 
The variable labelled in the tables as “share of business-owned patents” deserves additional 
explanation. It is a proxy for academic staff as inventors of patents not owned by universities 
or PROs –commonly known as academic-invented patents – calculated as: 
 
Business owned patents
Share of business owned patents
Business owned patents Academic owned patents

 
  
 (3)  
The denominator represents the maximum number of patents in which academic 
researchers may appear as inventors; the numerator expresses the maximum number of 
business-owned patents on which academic researchers may appear as inventors. Thus, the 
more business-owned patents in the economy in relation to the total number of patents held by 
both business enterprises and academic institutions, the more likely academic staff will be 
named on patents applied for by firms. 
This ratio will be equal to 1 if there are no academic-owned patents (academic staff more 
likely to be named as inventors on business patents) and will tend to zero as the number of 
academic-owned patents increases (academic staff less likely to be inventors on business 
patents).  That is, the variable expresses the potential proportion of business patents with 
academic inventors: higher values indicate higher potential proportions of business patents 
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with academic inventors. A negative sign of the regression coefficient indicates some 
substitution between owned and invented patents.
4
 
Since the denominator includes academic-owned patents, we treat the variable as 
endogenous and use two lags as GMM-type instruments for differenced equation. 
The choice of the dynamic panel model techniques is driven for the theoretical justification 
of considering the history of the dependent variable and for the way we have measured 
academic patenting (through the “share of business-owned patents” proxy), but not for the 
presence of unit root in single variables. According to the Fisher-type augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests for panel data (available upon request), the series are mostly stationary with a drift 
term, except for the logarithm of university R&D expenditure, which becomes stationary 
when a time trend is included. Most series on PRO patents and R&D are stationary even 
without a drift term or a time trend, suggesting that time variation is not important for the 
estimations. We report models where the constant acts as a drift term, and with a time trend. 
4.2. Estimation of university and PRO-owned patent production functions 
Table 3 presents econometric results. Column 1 includes the estimation of equation 1 in 
first differences for the EU27 country-years’ university sample. The specification tests detect 
neither autocorrelation nor overidentifying restrictions, so the specification of the model is 
correct. Column 2 includes the estimation for the EU27 country-years’ PRO sample. The 
Sargan test does not detect overidentification but the autocorrelation tests detect serial 
correlation of second order. Hence, we add one lag of the dependent variable to the 
specification and re-estimate equation 1 in Column 3. The tests now indicate that the 
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 Of course, this ratio is not a perfect measure, but there are no data on number academic-invented patents for 
the time and geographic scope we analyse. The closest attempt to generating these data is Crespi et al. (2010) for 
6 European countries. Their measure of university-invented patents correlates perfectly with ours and produces 
the same national ranking, so it gives some validity to our proxy. However, the correlation, although lower, is 
negative and still high in the case of PROs, and the national ranking is substantially different, which makes us 
cautious about using our proxy for the conclusions. 
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specification of the model is appropriate. Hence, we compare Columns 1 and 3 to verify our 
hypotheses (notice, however, that using Column 2 instead of 3 for comparison would have led 
to the same verification, which gives some robustness to the results). 
The lagged dependent variables are significant for PRO-owned patents but not for 
university-owned ones. This is interesting because, as mentioned in the introduction and in 
section 2.3, there has been more emphasis on IPR regulatory frameworks related to 
universities rather than to PROs. The former result suggests, however, that these frameworks 
are more determining for IPR at PROs than at universities, at least when the unit of analysis is 
the country, as in this paper. A possible explanation is the higher heterogeneity of PROs 
across countries compared to that of universities (also tackled in the introduction and section 
2.3.) This is not the focus of this paper, though, but verifying Hypotheses 1 and 2 is –which 
we do next. 
{Table 4 around here} 
The relation between university-owned patents and university R&D expenditure is not 
significant: the money universities spend on R&D does not have any effect on the number of 
patents they apply for. The same is not true for the relation between PRO-owned patents and 
PRO R&D expenditure. The relation between PRO-owned patents and PRO R&D 
expenditure is positive and significant: the more money PROs spend on R&D, the more 
patents they apply for. This provides evidence that the coefficient of R&D is significantly 
larger for PROs than for universities. Hence, the evidence supports Hypothesis 1. 
A Wald test indicates that the coefficient of PRO R&D expenditures is significantly lower 
than 1. A possible interpretation is that, other things equal, small countries are more efficient 
than large countries for PRO patent ownership as a ratio of PRO R&D expenditure. 
The relation between university-owned patents and the share of business funding of 
university R&D expenditure is positive and significant: the larger the proportion of industry 
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funding of universities, the higher the number of university patents. For PROs, the lack of 
significance of the funding structure is a difference with universities: a higher proportion of 
private funding is not conducive to patent ownership. Hence, the evidence favours that the 
impact of the share of business funding is larger for universities, which confirms Hypothesis 
2. 
4.3. Results about control variables 
The share of university R&D expenditure has no significant effect on patent ownership 
neither for universities nor for PROs. Hence, the structure of the public research expenditure 
does not seem decisive. 
The firm patent/R&D ratio has a positive, significant impact on patent ownership for both 
universities and PROs, suggesting that the latter are influenced by the same patenting rules as 
the rest of the economy. 
The first-year lags of the share of business-owned patents and PRO-invented patents have a 
negative, significant effect on the number of university-owned and PRO-owned patents, 
respectively. This result gives some support to the idea that the involvement of universities 
and PROs in patent ownership is excluding their involvement in invention. The second-year 
lag is not significant. 
The trend is significant for university- but not for PRO-owned patents. This is consistent 
with the fact that the unit root tests detected trend stationarity in university R&D and drift 
stationarity in all the PRO-related series. We also replaced the trend with time dummies and 
results were similar. Specifically, time dummies were significant from 1996 for the university 
sample and not significant in the PRO sample. 
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4.4. Robustness checks 
The results also hold in models estimated without robust standard errors (which are 
necessary to compute the Sargan test) or in models not treating the share of business-owned 
patents as an endogenous variable. We may still wonder whether the number of observations 
is too small. 
In order to alleviate this problem, in Columns 4 to 6 we extend the analysis to all countries 
included in Eurostat’s patents and R&D statistics (not only EU). Hence, the number of 
observations increases. The specification tests suggest that the model for universities in 
Column 4 is correct. In Column 5, for PROs, the Sargan test indicates that there are 
overidentifying restrictions. We reduce the number of instruments and present the re-
estimated model in Column 6, where the Sargan test indicates that this problem is solved. 
Comparison between Columns 4 and 6 leads to the same verification as before: acceptance of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (comparison between Column 4 and 5 would have led to the same result). 
The sign and significance of the control variables are also the same as in Columns 1 and 3. 
We have also explored nonlinearities in R&D and share of business funding by introducing 
their square terms as independent variables. R&D squared is highly collinear with the original 
R&D variable (even after centering both), so the results are unreliable. Share of business 
funding squared presents no collinearity problems. It is not significant and the rest of results 
hold, so we did not consider it worth showing the results (available upon request). 
5. Limitations 
This research is only a first step, which additional analysis would refine. Productivity 
analysis in this area increasingly relies on fine-grained micro-data to tackle the problems 
associated with the aggregated data of the type the paper uses, e.g. matching academic 
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inventor names to patent databases (Dietz and Bozeman 2005; Lissoni et al. 2008; Czarnitzki 
et al. 2012) or survey evidence. However, such studies find it hard to relate numbers of 
patents to monetary data, e.g. R&D expenditures, because R&D data are not attributable to 
micro units like individual researchers. Hence, our approach provides another interesting 
angle to the subject. 
A disadvantage of our study that we cannot break down patents according to technology 
classes because Eurostat does not publish that data at the institutional level. Nevertheless, 
although it would allow for performing an additional robustness check, it is not clear how it 
would change our hypotheses. Hence, from the theoretical point of view, this paper still poses 
interesting questions and the evidence shown is just a first approach. 
The way PROs are presented in this paper is far from a unified set of organizations, as 
acknowledged in the literature review. In general, the PRO grouping is more heterogeneous 
than universities while also being less standardized in terms of research agendas, funding 
schemes, etc. The role that public R&D plays for different sections of PROs is an element of 
the Frascati manual and its current revision: in some countries the PROs in question are 
defined as private sector. The Eurostat definition of PRO patents (which uses name-matching) 
does not take such details into consideration when identifying PRO patents. This can amplify 
the mismatch between funding and patents. We have tried to partially control for this by using 
dynamic panel models and performing robustness checks, but of course, common standards of 
data production about institutional allocation of R&D and patent data would be better. 
Similarly, there are differences among universities. Some research universities are more 
active in patenting compared to other teaching-oriented institutions. Controlling for the type 
of universities in the country would allow for a more accurate comparison with PROs. 
However, the relevant data are not available for the time and country coverage of this study. 
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We hope that on aggregate differences of this kind will cancel out and, as in the case of PROs, 
that our techniques have mitigated possible remaining problems. 
6. Conclusions 
The analysis in this paper tries to be a preliminary step to approach the production of 
patents in universities and in PROs on the average of different countries, in light of relative 
R&D expenditures. The panel approach to gauge the relative magnitudes of expenditures and 
patent rates provides a rough-and-ready measure to handle the relative importance of 
patenting (by country and over time) of these institutional sectors, in light of the concurrent 
development of patenting in the business enterprise sector and other control factors. 
The prevailing policy recommendations concerning university and PRO patent ownership 
are mainly managerial: designing simple and harmonised IPRs allowing for knowledge 
transfer and cooperation between public research and industry (EC 2007b); pooling resources 
between several knowledge transfer offices, implementing model contracts which make 
publishing and patenting compatible (EC 2007a), etc. According to our research, it would be 
useful to extend this view to an economic perspective that considers the role of R&D in the 
process. By doing so, policy targets would find it justified: (i) inverting the current decline of 
PRO R&D expenditure, because it is detrimental to the desired objective of increasing PRO 
owned- patents
5
; (ii) using the characteristics of PRO patent ownership as a benchmark for 
universities, because they present two advantages: 
First, PROs have own R&D linked to patent production, which may introduce criteria for 
efficiency, i.e. an elasticity of R&D lower than 1 at national level prevails in the case of PRO-
owned patents, indicating that smaller countries are more efficient than larger ones. No such 
                                                 
5
 According to Eurostat data, for PROs, and as opposed to universities, R&D is decreasing in real terms (the 
growth rate between 1981 and 2006 was -24%). 
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relation can be established in the case of universities. This difference may be due to the 
universities’ teaching mission, which does not apply to PROs. R&D at universities is spread 
across scientific outcomes, such as patenting and teaching, whereas at PROs it is focused 
exclusively on patenting. Increasing the synergies between university scientific products and 
teaching would make universities more comparable to PROs in terms of patent-ownership. 
Second, PROs produce patents with independence of business funding, in contrast with 
universities, which need such funding. It is yet to be seen whether the former is really better, 
but at least it reduces the fear of excessive industrial influence on public science. Certainly, 
PROs have different roles in the countries within the EU, so more fine-grained research 
should find which types of PROs are leading this result before making this conclusion 
applicable to all countries. 
Acknowledgements 
This research started within the framework of ERAWATCH, a joint initiative of the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and the Joint Research Centre-
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS). Without the continuous support of 
René van Bavel and Xabier Goenaga, in the IPTS Knowledge for Growth (KfG) Unit, it 
would not have been possible to carry it on. Numerous conversations with Pablo D’Este, Sean 
Kask, Jordi Molas-Gallart, Dimitrios Pontikakis, Francesco Rentocchini and María Rochina 
were helpful for content and methodological issues. Colleagues from the KfG Unit provided 
enriching comments during seminar presentations. Attendants at the 3
rd
 Annual Conference of 
the EPIP Association, the 2
nd
 COMMUNIA Conference and the 2012 European Seminar 
EuroLIO offered valuable ideas, with a special mention to my discussants Isabel M. Bodas-
Freitas and Benjamin Coriat. Martin Meyer gave a helpful hand about institutional concerns. 
  20 
Finally, Jeff Furman and Francesco Lissoni revised former versions of the paper and made 
extremely profitable comments. 
References 
Acosta, D., Coronado D., León, M.D., Martínez, M., 2008. Production of university technological knowledge in 
European regions: evidence from patent data. Regional Studies, 43 (9): 1167-1181. 
Acosta, D., Coronado D., Martínez, M., 2012. Spatial differences in the quality of university patenting: Do 
regions matter? Research Policy, 41 (9): 692-703. 
Ankrah, S.N., Burgess, T.F., Grimshaw, P., Shaw, N.E., 2013. Asking both university and industry actors about 
their engagement in knowledge transfer: What single-group studies of motives omit. Technovation 33: 50-65. 
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo evidence and an 
application to employment equations. Review of Economic Studies 58: 277-297. 
Arvanitis, S., Kubli, U., Woerter, M., 2008. University-industry knowledge and technology transfer in 
Switzerland: What university scientists think about co-operation with private enterprises. Research Policy 37: 
1865–1883. 
Azagra Caro, J.M., Fernández de Lucio, I. Gutiérrez Gracia, A. 2003. University patents: output and input 
indicators… of what? Research Evaluation, 12 (1): 5-16. 
Azagra-Caro, J.M., Archontakis, F., Yegros-Yegros, A., 2007a. In which regions do universities patent and 
publish more? Scientometrics 70 (2): 251-266 
Azagra-Caro, J.M., Carayol, N., Llerena, P., 2006a. Patent Production at a European Research University: 
Exploratory Evidence at the Laboratory Level. Journal of Technology Transfer, 31 (3): 257-268. 
Azagra-Caro, J.M., Plaza-Gómez, L., Romero-de-Pablos, A., 2007b. The origin of public research organisation 
patents: an economic approach. Research Evaluation 16 (4): 271-282 
Azagra-Caro, J.M., Yegros-Yegros, A., Archontakis, F., 2006b. What do university patent routes indicate at 
regional level? Scientometrics, 66 (1): 219-230. 
Bach, L., Llerena, P., 2007. Indicators of higher-education institutes and public-research organizations 
technology transfer activities: insights from France. Science and Public Policy 34 (10): 709–721. 
Baldini, N., 2006a. The Act on inventions at public research institutions: Danish universities’ patenting activity. 
Scientometrics 69 (2): 387–407. 
  21 
Baldini, N., 2006b. University patenting and licensing activity: a review of the literature. Research Evaluation 15 
(3), 197-207. 
Baldini, N., 2009. Implementing Bayh-Dole-Like Laws: Faculty Problems and Their Impact on University 
Patenting Activity. Research Policy 38 (8): 1217–1224. 
Baldini, N., 2010. Do royalties really foster university patenting activity? An answer from Italy. Technovation 
30: 109-116. 
Baldini, N., Grimaldi, R., Sobrero, M., 2006. Institutional changes and the commercialization of academic 
knowledge: A study of Italian universities’ patenting activities between 1965 and 2002. Research Policy 35: 
518-532. 
Breschi, S., Lissoni, F., Montobbio, F. (2008). University patenting and scientific productivity: a quantitative 
study of Italian academic inventors. European Management Review 5: 91-109. 
Buenstorf, G., 2009. Is commercialization good or bad for science? Individual-level evidence from the Max 
Planck Society. Research Policy 38: 281–292. 
Carayol, N., 2007. Academic incentives, research organization and patenting at a large French university. 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 16 (2): 119-138. 
Cesaroni, F., Piccaluga, A., 2005. Universities and Intellectual Property Rights in Southern European Countries. 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 17 (4): 497–518. 
Coupé, T., 2003. Science is Golden: Academic R&D and University Patents. Journal of Technology Transfer, 
28: 31-46. 
Crespi, G.A., Geuna, A., Nomaler, Ö., Verspagen, B., 2010. University IPRs and knowledge transfer: is 
university ownership more efficient? Economics of Innovation and New Technology 19(7): 627-648. 
Czarnitzki, D., Hussinger, K., Schneider, C., 2012. The nexus between science and industry: evidence from 
faculty inventions. Journal of Technology Transfer 37 (5): 755-776. 
D’Este, P., Perkmann, M., 2011. Why do academics engage with industry? The entrepreneurial university and 
individual motivations. Journal of Technology Transfer 36 (3): 316-339. 
Dietz, J.S., Bozeman, B., 2005. Academic careers, patents, and productivity: industry experience as scientific 
and technical human capital. Research Policy 34 (3): 349–367. 
Dosi, G., Llerena, P., Labini, M.S., 2006. Science–Technology–Industry Links and the ‘European Paradox’: 
Some Notes on the Dynamics of Scientific and Technological Research in Europe. In: Lorenz, E.H., 
  22 
Lundvall, B.-Å. (eds.), How Europe's Economies Learn: Coordinating competing models. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
EC, 2007a. Commission communication ‘Improving knowledge transfer between research institutions and 
industry across Europe: embracing open innovation’, COM(2007) 182. 
EC, 2007b. Commission Green Paper ‘The European Research Area: New Perspectives’, COM(2007) 161. 
Gaughan, M. and Corley, E.A., 2010. Science faculty at US research universities: The impacts of university 
research center-affiliation and gender on industrial activities. Technovation 30: 215–222. 
Geuna, A., Llerena, P., Matt, M., Savona, M., 2004. Collaboration between a research university and firms and 
other institutions. In: Cesaroni, F., Gambardella, A., García-Fontes, W. (eds.): R&D, innovation, and 
competitiveness in the European chemical industry. Boston: Kluwer, ch. 6. 
Geuna, A., Rossi, F., 2011. Changes to university IPR regulations in Europe and the impact on academic 
patenting. Research Policy 40: 1068-1076. 
Grimpe, C., Fier, H., 2010. Informal university technology transfer: a comparison between the United States and 
Germany. Journal of Technology Transfer 35 (6): 637-650. 
Hall, B. H., Griliches, Z., Hausman, J. A., 1986. Patents and R&D: Is there a lag? International Economic 
Review 27 (2): 265-283. 
Krabel, S., Mueller, P., 2009. What drives scientists to start their own company? An empirical investigation of 
Max Planck Society scientists. Research Policy 38: 947–956. 
Lissoni, F., Llerena, P., McKelvey, M., Sanditov, B., 2008. Academic patenting in Europe: new evidence from 
the KEINS database. Research Evaluation 17 (2): 87–102. 
Marinova, D., 2001. Eastern European patenting activities in the USA. Technovation 21: 571–584. 
Meyer, M., 2006. Are patenting scientists the better scholars? An exploratory comparison of inventor-authors 
with their non-inventing peers in nano-science and technology. Research Policy 35 (2006) 1646–1662. 
Meyer, M., Du Pleiss, M., Tukeva, T., Utecht, J.T., 2005. Inventive output of academic research: a comparison 
of two science systems. Scientometrics 63 (1): 145-161. 
Moutinho, P.S.F., Fontes, M., Godinho, M.M., 2007. Do individual factors matter? A survey of scientists’ 
patenting in Portuguese public research organizations. Scientometrics 70 (2): 355–377. 
Nelson, R.R., Rosenberg, N., 1993. Technical Innovation and national Systems. In: Nelson, R.R. (ed.), National 
Innovation Systems. New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1. 
  23 
Nilsson, A.S., Rickne, A., Bengtsson, L., 2010. Transfer of academic research: uncovering the grey zone. Journal 
of Technology Transfer 35 (6): 617-636. 
Núñez-Sánchez, R., Barge-Gil, A., Modrego-Rico, A., 2012. Performance of knowledge interactions between 
public research centres and industrial firms in Spain: a project-level analysis. Journal of Technology Transfer 
37: 330–354. 
OECD, 2001. Using Patent Counts for Cross-Country Comparisons of Technology Output. STI Review 27. 
Okamuro, H., Nishimura, J., 2013. Impact of university intellectual property policy on the performance of 
university-industry research collaboration. Journal of Technology Transfer 38 (3): 273-301. 
Patel, P., Pavitt, K., 1995. Patterns of technological activity: their measurement and interpretation. In: Stoneman, 
P. (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation and Technological Change, ch. 2. UK: Blackwell. 
Pavitt, K., 1998. Do patents reflect the useful research output of universities? Research evaluation 7 (2): 105-11. 
Ponomariov, B.L., 2007. Effects of university characteristics on scientists’ interactions with the private sector: an 
exploratory assessment. Journal of Technology Transfer 33 (5): 485-503. 
Potì, B., Reale, E., 2005. The patenting regime in the Italian public research system. What motivates public 
inventors to patent. Ceris-Cnr, Working Paper N° 10/2005. 
PREST, 2002. A Comparative Analysis of Public, Semi-Public and Recently Privatised Research Centres, 
mimeo: ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/indicators/docs/ind_report_prest1.pdf, last access: 20/02/2009. 
Proton, 2007. The ProTon Europe 2005 Annual Survey report, mimeo: http://www.fptt-
pftt.gc.ca/eng/resources/articles/2007/06/ProTonEurope2005.html, last access: 20/02/2009. 
Van Looy, B., du Plessis, M.,Magerman, T., 2006. Data Production Methods for Harmonized Patent Indicators: 
Assignee sector allocation. Eurostat Working Paper and Studies, Luxembourg. 
Wong, P.K., Singh, A., 2009. University patenting activities and their link to the quantity and quality of 
scientific publications. Scientometrics, 83:271–294. 
Yang, P.Y., Chang, Y.-C., 2010. Academic research commercialization and knowledge production and diffusion: 
the moderating effects of entrepreneurial commitment. Scientometrics, 83:403–421. 
Unlinked reference 
Furman, J.L., Porter, M.E., Stern, S., 2002. The determinants of national innovative capacity. Research Policy 
31: 899–933.  
  24 
Tables 
 
Table 1  
Variables and definitions 
Variable Definition 
University sample  
# of academic-owned patents Number of patent applications filed by 
universities at the European Patent Office (EPO) 
R&D expenditure Higher education R&D expenditure in millions of 
Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) deflated at 
1995 prices
1
 
Share of business funding of 
academic R&D 
Ratio of business funding of higher education 
R&D expenditure over total higher education  
R&D expenditure
2
 
Share of business-owned patents Number of business patents over the sum of 
business plus university patents 
  
PRO sample  
# of academic-owned patents Number of patent applications filed by 
government at the European Patent Office (EPO) 
R&D expenditure Government R&D expenditure in millions of PPS 
deflated at 1995 prices 
Share of business funding of 
academic R&D 
Ratio of business funding of government R&D 
expenditure over total government R&D 
expenditure 
Share of business-owned patents Number of business patents over the sum of 
business plus government patents 
  
Both samples  
Share of university R&D 
expenditure 
Ratio of higher education R&D expenditure over 
the sum of higher education R&D expenditure 
plus government R&D expenditure 
Firm patent/R&D ratio Ratio of the number of patents owned by business 
firms over the business firm’s expenditure on 
R&D 
Trend Priority year 
Data source: Eurostat’s online database, which is regularly updated. We downloaded data in September 2012 
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/science_technology_innovation/data/database) 
1 
Instead of expenditure on R&D, we tried R&D personnel. The two variables were highly correlated, so we do 
not include them in the same estimation. The fit was always better for expenditure than for personnel (as in 
Azagra et al. 2007a). We used other human capital variables, such as number of researchers and ratio of R&D 
expenditure to R&D personnel or researchers, but this did not provide any additional information. They also 
presents the disadvantage that the data for US are very incomplete in Eurostat. 
2
 We tried estimations adding share of government funding of R&D, but they were not significant. 
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Table 2  
Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
University sample (N=347)     
# of academic-owned patents 93.01 256.54 0.06 1465.76 
R&D expenditure 3,145.16 5,928.45 10.00 35100.00 
Share of business funding of academic 
R&D 0.06 0.07 
0.00 0.50 
Firm patent/R&D ratio 0.27 0.18 0.00 1.23 
Share of university R&D expenditure 0.45 0.17 0.11 0.94 
Share of business-owned patents 0.96 0.06 0.33 1.00 
PRO sample (N=357)     
# of academic-owned patents 42.77 71.96 0.03 373.37 
R&D expenditure 3,120.56 6,420.26 10.00 29730.00 
Share of business funding of academic 
R&D 0.07 0.06 
0.00 0.27 
Firm patent/R&D ratio 0.27 0.17 0.00 0.77 
Share of university R&D expenditure 0.55 0.16 0.00 0.89 
Share of business-owned patents 0.98 0.03 0.63 1.00 
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Table 3  
Arellano-Bond dynamic panel-data estimation of the determinants of academic (university or PRO)-owned patents 
 
 1 
Ln # of university-
owned patents 
2 
Ln # of PRO-owned 
patents (one-lagged 
dep. variable) 
3 
Ln # of PRO-owned 
patents (two-lagged 
dep. variables) 
4 
Ln # of university-
owned patents (not 
only EU) 
5 
Ln # of PRO-
owned patents 
(not only EU) 
6 
Ln # of PRO-owned 
patents (not only 
EU, limited number 
of instruments) 
Ln lagged # of academic-owned patents (lag 1) 0.11 0.32*** 0.21** 0.17 0.33*** 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.18) 
Ln lagged # of academic-owned patents (lag 2)   0.29***    
   (0.07)    
Ln R&D expenditure -0.01 0.90*** 0.62*** -0.20 0.51** 0.61*** 
 (0.23) (0.26) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.23) 
Share of business funding of academic R&D 2.89*** 1.50 -0.54 2.23** -0.57 -0.43 
 (0.98) (0.78) (0.56) (0.90) (0.92) (1.68) 
Ln firm patent/R&D ratio 0.90*** 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.84*** 0.57*** 1.11*** 
 (0.08) (0.18) (0.16) (0.08) (0.13) (0.23) 
Share of university R&D expenditure 0.09 2.02** 1.07 -0.43 -0.06 1.13 
 (0.76) (0.87) (0.66) (0.72) (0.99) (1.46) 
Share of business-owned patents (lag 1) -16.05*** -17.07*** -21.80*** -16.83*** -18.80*** -24.00*** 
 (1.95) (4.81) (6.72) (1.91) (4.73) (6.28) 
Share of business-owned patents (lag 2) 2.97 10.64** 4.71 3.81** 11.01** 7.41 
 (1.69) (4.36) (2.54) (1.57) (4.62) (6.41) 
Trend 0.08*** -0.02 -0.01 0.08*** 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -135.00*** 46.61 35.03 -145.47*** -10.94 19.38 
 (32.19) (27.41) (20.79) (29.04) (25.92) (42.14) 
Observations 223 234 219 306 321 321 
Groups 21 19 17 27 26 26 
χ2 1,222 172 942 794 122 68 
Prob(χ2) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sargan test 209 221 221 300 332** 44 
Autocorrelation tests Not significant Significant Not significant Not significant Not significant Not significant 
*** Significant at 1%. ** Significant at 5%. Robust standard errors in brackets. Sargan test calculated for model without robust standard errors. Share of business-owned 
patents is  treated as  an endogenous variable. 
